



The Strategic Security Engagement between the African Union and the European Union in Conflict Management in Africa: The Challenges

Dingji Maza KANGDIM* - Cemal YORGANCIOĞLU** -
Kwopnan Ibrahim BULUS***

Abstract

This article uses a qualitative research approach comprising of descriptive analysis and extensive desk review to carry out a critical analysis of the strategic security engagement between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) in addressing the challenges associated with conflict and other complex security threats facing the African continent. The findings and conclusions of the article suggest that; although the EU security engagement supports the broader AU security framework, challenges such as selective funding, non-accountability in the disbursement and utilization of funds, excessive over-reliance, and dependence of the AU on external actors in addressing the various complex security threats facing the continent still exist. Therefore, addressing these challenges will require a symmetric and multidimensional cooperation and responses between these two actors driving the process for efficient impact.

Keywords: African Union, European Union, Security Community, Peace, Security, Conflict Management.

* Dr., Olive-Edge Consulting, Jos, Nigeria, mdingji@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0003-1059-8707.

** Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nicosia, TRNC. cemal.yorgancioglu@baucyprus.edu.tr; ORCID: 0000-0002-2885-7853.

*** Dr., Department of Political Science, University of Jos, Nigeria. kapal4ull@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0001-5579-8329.

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Afrika'da Çatışma Yönetiminde Afrika Birliği ile Avrupa Birliği Arasındaki Stratejik Güvenlik Katılımı: Zorluklar

Öz

Bu makale, Afrika kıtasının karşı karşıya olduğu çatışma ve diğer karmaşık güvenlik tehditleriyle ilgili zorlukların ele alınmasında Afrika Birliği (AfB) ile Avrupa Birliği (AB) arasındaki stratejik güvenlik katılımının eleştirel bir analizini incelemek için açıklayıcı analiz ve kapsamlı masa başı incelemesini içeren nitel bir araştırma yaklaşımı kullanmaktadır. Makalenin bulguları ve sonuçları, AB güvenlik katılımının daha geniş bir AfB güvenlik çerçevesini desteklemesine rağmen, kıtanın karşı karşıya olduğu çeşitli karmaşık güvenlik tehditlerini ele almada seçici finansman, fonların dağıtılması ve kullanımında hesap sorulmaması, haddinden fazla aşırı güven ve AfB'ye dış aktörlere bağımlılık gibi zorlukların hala mevcut olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, bu eksikliğin ve zorluğun ele alınması, asimetrik ve çok boyutlu bir işbirliği ve bu iki aktör arasındaki tepkilerin süreci verimli bir etki için yönlendirmesini gerektirir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afrika Birliği, Avrupa Birliği, Güvenlik Topluluğu, Barış, Güvenlik, Çatışma Yönetimi.

Introduction

Africa has been described as the theatre of intra and interstate conflicts (Young, 2002; Williams, 2017). This is because most states in the region after independence have witnessed or are currently experiencing various degrees of violence and conflict that has had far-reaching implications on not only the stability of the continent but has also contributed to the underdevelopment of the continent in comparison with its counterparts in Asia and Latin America (King, 2005; Badmus, 2015). As indicated by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2017), the nature of conflicts and insecurity in Africa has led to over one million recorded deaths and the displacement of millions of people scattered across the various refugee camps in the continent. These security challenges require a regional, sub-regional and state response from the various regional, sub-regional and state players in the continent. The defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) that later transformed to the African Union (AU) failed to tackle these challenges by

proffering the needed solutions to the problems on the continent. This was witnessed in the conflicts in states like Somalia, Rwanda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone among other states. As conflicts persisted and spread across the continent, the international community and African states did not show the required operational and logistical capacity to overcome the daunting challenge of halting these spates of violence, conflicts, and state failure (Brown 1990; Williams & Boutellis, 2014). Given that these actors, largely attributed conflicts, violence and the security question in Africa to the fact that these actors failed to adequately take cognizance of the fact that:

“African countries have different histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of internal and international interaction. The sources of conflicts in Africa reflect this diversity and complexity. Some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region, and some have important international dimensions. Despite these differences the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences” (Annan, 1998; 2004).

Historically, the defunct OAU was established and saddled with the responsibility of promoting the political and economic integration of the continent (Robert, 1970; Klaas, 2019). However, several decades after its establishment, it became apparent that several challenges, which stemmed from disputes between and within states, confronted the organization. The growing concern over insecurity, conflict, and other forms of transnational threats facing the continent and the ineptitude of the OAU to provide solutions to the challenges led to the transformation of the organization into the AU in 2002. The transition to the AU was done to ensure that the AU is well-rooted to tackle the various complex emergent threats facing the continent (Oteng 2005; Ogheneruonah, 2014).

Furthermore, this transformation brought in certain fundamental shifts in the politics and policy of regionalism on the continent, especially the introduction of certain fundamental caveats in the Constitutive Act of the AU that include the replacement of the policy of non-interference to that of non-indifference, the establishment of a common security and defence policy under the umbrella of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as a policy roadmap geared towards tackling the various security challenges facing the continent (Powell &

Tieku 2005; Kwesi & Atuobi, 2009; Besada, 2010; Vines 2013; Williams, 2014). However, the experience of the AU since its transformation also exposes the fundamental challenge to peace and security. That further shows the intricate linkage between the perception of member states of the AU and their willingness to work towards the effective establishment of a more robust and concrete mechanism for a continental response to these challenges (Makinda, Okumu & Mickler, 2015). The failure to cope with the forces of change and civilization also resulted in difficulties associated with immediate security threats such as militancy, banditry, insurgency and terrorism. As witnessed in Somalia with the Al-Shabaab, the Mujahideen in Sudan, the Tuareg rebel, Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) operating in Mali, and the Sahel region, to Boko Haram and its other faction Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) operating in North-East Nigeria and the Lake Chad (Bøås & Dunn, 2007; Solomon 2015; Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020). The impact of these new forms of threats has affected various sectors of the security and development of the continent. These threats presented an avenue and a better platform for the AU to engage with other multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the EU, to further assist and complement the search for solutions to African problems (Ramsbotham, Bah, & Calder 2005; Ulf & Porto 2008; Fawcett & Gandois, 2010; Silander, 2013; Gebrehiot, 2017; Desmidt, 2019). That stance by the AU opened the vistas for the EU to engage and assist the AU in dealing with these challenges that stemmed from conflicts, insecurity and other forms of transnational threats (Dannreuther, 2004; Farrell, 2005; Merlingen, 2012; Bossong, 2012; Sıradağ, 2014; Koenig, 2016).

The EU security strategy and engagement with Africa was conceived around 2005 in Brussels on the premise that both the AU and EU believed that it was in their strategic interest to collaborate and merge on their existing relations that will further strengthen the operational capacity of the AU to tackle the challenges to peace, security, and stability of the continent (Charles, 2005; Farrell, 2005; European Union Committee, 2006; Haastруп, 2013; Chappell, Mawdsley, & Petrov, 2016). As put forward by (Kingeziel, 2005; Ramsbotham, Bah & Calder, 2005; Besada, 2009), available studies and a growing literature further revealed that the APSA is regarded as the entry point for promoting peace and security in the continent within the overall strategic framework of the AU–EU security relations. The APSA and its five critical pillars and structures which includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel

of the Wise (POW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Peace Fund (APF) is considered the pathway to ensuring peace and security in the African continent.

Despite the various extant studies on AU-EU relations in Africa, there is a dearth of research on the strategic security relationship between these two multilateral actors, and how the actors can use the paradox of security community to effectively address the growing concerns affecting them. It is, therefore, within this context that this article will assess the strategic security role and engagement between the AU and the EU in conflict management that incorporates the broader picture and context of strengthening an effective security community that seeks the promotion of peace, security, management and resolution of conflicts, and other forms of threats in the continent. In doing so, this article will assess this strategic relationship between the AU and EU in conflict management with these fundamental research questions of what is the nature of AU-EU joint security cooperation? What are the challenges that hinder an effective AU-EU joint security community strategy for conflict management in Africa? The methodology adopted for this study is the qualitative research approach which involves an extensive review of extant literature that focuses on the strategic security engagement of the case studies: African Union and the European Union in conflict Management in Africa. Other primary documents and secondary sources such as communiqué, reports and press releases from the two multilateral institutions within the context of this strategic security engagement between the AU and the EU is analysed. The article seeks to contribute to the existing debate and narrative on security cooperation within the theoretical context and framework of a “*security community*”. The Security community views such cooperation as important in ensuring peace, stability and containing the various forms of local and transnational threats.

Thematically, the article is structured and organized to examine the relevant literature that seeks to explain the nature and component of the relationship between the AU and EU joint security engagements in relation to in conflict management. The following section of the article will establish the linkage between the AU and EU joint strategic partnership in peace and security. The challenges facing this strategic engagement between the case studies will follow the preceding section before the conclusion and the policy implications.

**AU-EU Strategic Partnership in Peace, Security and Conflict Management:
What do Existing Studies Say?**

Scholars of Security Community theory trace and link the origin of the theory to the Constructivist theory of International Relations which based most of its arguments within the lenses of societal and ideational constructs responsible for the actions and inactions of states and non-state actors in the international arena (Acharya, 1991; Williams & Neumann, 2000; Khoo, 2004; Adler, 2008; Neumann & Sending, 2010). By way of definition, Security Community has to do with series of processes and actions through which states and non-state actors coalesce their forces together in order to strengthen their collective security from any perceived threat or aggressor (Pouliot, 2006). They do that either through amalgamation in which sovereign states surrender their might into one strong indivisible entity or through the process of integration which will see these states establishing organizations that promote and protect their collective security and strategic interests from being attacked by any aggressor or violent non-state actor (Collins, 2013). Many international relations experts were of the view that the end of World Wars I & II, Cold War and Post-Cold War periods saw the emergence of various multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) etc. established along global, regional and sub-regional lines with each saddled with the responsibility of protecting the collective and strategic interests of its members from any action that threatens its survival in the global arena (Mattern, 2005; Collins, 2013). Within this context, the international system saw the emergence of various multilateral organizations at the global, regional and sub-regional levels where states believe their interests and goals can be attained collectively as well as it is providing them the necessary platform for relative gains and benefits of belonging to a community of nations.

Various studies (Farrel, 2005; Sicurelli, 2008; Olsen, 2013; Plank, 2017), suggest that the joint strategic relationship and synergy between the AU and the EU can be seen within the context of three lenses. First, cooperation for the promotion of strategic and common security interests. Secondly, an engagement based on peace and security, mutual assistance and capacity building. Thirdly, cooperation within the context of conflict management. Consequently, as hinted by (Kotsopoulos, 2007;

Toni 2013; Davis, 2015; Schmidt, 2016), these strategic engagements and cooperation between the AU and the EU will further enhance and protect their mutual strategic interests. This narrative shows the expediency and the need for the two multilateral actors to unite and cooperate to enhance their alliance and collectively protect their interests against certain fundamental negative forces of change may that threaten their development and growth.

It was further revealed that the EU continued to partner with the AU in the promotion of assistance in various aspects of capacity and development building that will not only promote trade, investments but also ensure that the APSA security framework is operationally and financially sustained to bolster its operational capacity (Ramsbotham, Bah & Calder, 2005: 328; Franke, 2009; Pirozzi, 2009). Furthermore, studies by (Assanvo & Pout, 2007; Vines, 2010; 2012b; Pirozzi 2009, 2010; Miranda, Pirozzi & Schäfer, 2012; Haastrup, 2013; Williams & Boutellis, 2014) also revealed the strategic engagement between the AU and EU on how the two regional players can cooperate and engage effectively in the promotion of peace, stability and security of not only Africa but the EU in line with challenges associated with transnational security threats. These studies suggested series of measures taken by the European Union Peace and Security Committee (EUPSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) that will enhance peace and security between the two actors. This joint partnership provides a platform for the AU to understand the EU security mechanism, in which the APSA security framework is specifically modelled after. This is to make it more vibrant and robust in confronting conflicts, insecurity and other forms of threats facing the continent. This strategic engagement between the two players was to further enhance, consolidate, and entrench peace and stability between the two continents.

Kufuor (2005) was of the view that one of the fundamental factors that led to the transition from the OAU to the AU was the inability of the OAU to address and manage the various conflicts, violence and insecurities that characterized the regional politics of the union. After the transformation to the AU in 2002, the need for a broader expansion and synergy between the AU and other multilateral partners was necessary and vital especially, if the organization wants to play an important role in every dynamic change that characterized the politics of regional integration, especially in the twenty-first century. As a result of this, various researches

(Martinelli, 2006; Gegout, 2009; Grasa & Mateos, 2010; Keohane, 2011; Vines, 2012; Williams, 2013; Griffin, 2016; EU, 2016a; 2018b) revealed that the EU strategically engaged and assisted the AU in various aspects of conflicts management after it transitioned. These studies revealed that the EU continued to engage the AU in managing conflicts in the continent stemming from the conflict in the DRC to the conflict in Mali, the crises around the Horn of Africa or East Africa where Al-Shabaab continued to become an existential threat to the conflict in the Central African Republic. The growing rise and activities of radical insurgent and terrorist groups operating across the Sahel continent, the North-Eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region where Boko Haram and other radical groups such as its other breakout faction the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) continue to reign attacks saw the commitment of the EU to assist the various peace-keeping operations and task-force established to tame the activities of these terror groups and manage these transnational security threats in the continent. The studies show the various strategic engagements and multilateral relationship that exists between the EU and the AU in the promotion of peace, security, and stability of the continent.

To conclude this section, studies by Nye (1999) and Collier (2015) critiqued the nature of conflicts, threats and insecurity facing Africa and Europe. This was largely attributed to the various socio-cultural dynamics between the continents, state-building and formation processes, and the operational capacity of institutions to effectively address challenges facing their climes. Therefore, any security cooperation between these two multilateral actors should be able to take cognizance of the socio-cultural mix of the two continents, the nature, and dynamics of conflicts facing the two continents, and the ability of institutions to respond and address contemporary security threats facing them.

Exterior Solutions to Africa's Problems

First, the “African solutions discourse” is a situation where the roles of external actors take precedence, and on the other hand, Africa's problems and challenges are followed, not at the forefront. The UN organs and specialized agencies, the European Union (EU), the United States (US), France, Great Britain, Russia, China, etc., powerful states persistently wanted to be at the forefront of proposing and implementing solutions to Africa's social-economic and political problems. As for peace and security, proactive interventions by external actors help

bring many conflicts in Africa under control. However, the adage that Africa must have its solutions to its problems grows on the anxieties raised by such interventions. There is increasing criticism that external interventions could sometimes move into interest-oriented (hidden) motivations, pursue cosmetic solutions, endanger the security conditions, disregard social concerns and consequences, and intended to eternalize the neo-colonialism in Africa (Payandeh, 2012; Burgess, 2018). The sum of these criticisms observes and evaluates the effectiveness, motivation, and, most importantly, the reliability of outside interventions.

The reliability aspect (which is one of the most significant facts) resulted in an utter fiasco in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Interference in such a crisis will not be in their concerns, and again in such a situation, it provides a strong enough signal to remind the possibility of external actors leaving African states when the need reach is at its height. Western powers and the UN, which are eager to intervene under normal circumstances, have either been late to end the crises or have stayed away from pursuing a proactive policy. Throughout the 1990s, they were not sufficiently motivated for the armed struggles that felled in the DRC, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone (Bogland, Egnell & Lagerström, 2008). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has reacted to the issues by sending soldiers to suppress events occurring in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In addition, Africa faces numerous socio-political and economic difficulties that can be hard to determine by foreigners whose national interests are a priority.

In the meaning of effectiveness, initiatives by foreign actors have often played a role in guiding disputes in Africa. However, it has been determined that the approaches used offer cosmetic solutions that do not provide more security rather than lasting peace in many conflict zones (Møller, 2009). In this regard, some scholars have stated that the intervention of western foreign actors has chosen to use militarist and legal approaches, which are compelling factors, rather than their involvement in African political relations (Francis, 2008).

It has been decided that the US intervention in Somalia in 1992 gave little consideration to the effectiveness of military intervention in the conflict environment (Berman & Sams, 2000). During the NATO's military intervention in Libya in 2011, the dominant forces did not hesitate to implement dire consequences in Africa in the context of their conflict solution. A collapsed state structure that greeted the Arab

Spring of the Gaddafi regime, the rapid spread of anarchic environment, the country's threat to the stability of the region as well as its stability, and beyond all these factors, its geographical location in the south of Europe, brought a sudden military operation to the agenda. Despite all these years, visibly, issues far from local solutions remain unresolved despite all the selfless efforts of foreign powers. Everything that experienced peacekeepers has done to establish peace remains obsolete (Akonor, 2016; Payandeh, 2012).

In terms of motivation, external power's narrow-minded interests in Africa's mineral resources point to another problematic area regarding the interventions of foreign powers. Behind these purposeful interventions are the concerns that Africa may be hindered in gaining access to its resources. The terrible images drawn by the memories will inevitably reflect colonialism, imperialism and, accordingly, the prevailing states of the West, even if the intervention to be made is likely to be well-intentioned. Although the racial superiority theses have been scribbled, the bad decolonization experience of Africa stands in the category of ready-made solutions and recommendations imported/imposed for Africa. In this context, there is concern that traces of white Western supremacy may still be more visible (Berman & Sams, 2000).

According to some authors, they have suggested that the idea underlying the crafty motive of foreign interference is to intensify the belief in the superiority of prevailing forces (Salem, 1993). Despite the practical initiatives undertaken by African participants, there is still a school of thought that claims that the best solutions to Africa's challenges are the dominant western powers (Munemo, 2016). According to Salem "in transporting Western conflict resolution theories and techniques to the [...] world or elsewhere, they must undergo considerable cultural adaptation" (1993: 369) due to that mainstream thought always represents western powers as "good". Where colonialism ended, a new life began, a new order was established.

"The emergence of an artificially constructed modern state with internal contradictions and a sophisticated state apparatus and weaponry, coupled with the presence of external forces, has made Africa one of the most unstable regions in the world, and has made creation of peace prospects a daunting task" (Munya, 1999: 537).

In this sense, one thing needs to be clarified. Whether the intervention is performed by an African or an external actor, there will always be a whiff of construction. In this context, while many African writers advocate establishing a critical relationship with indigenous values in terms of peace and security, while on the other hand, they noted these dynamics and the limitations of the so-called dominant western perspective (Porto, 2008).

What is the AU-EU Security Strategy for Africa: Establishing the Nexus?


The EU security strategy and engagement in Africa show and reveal the commitment by the organization towards the attainment of durable and sustainable peace and security in the continent (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Holland, 2008). As put forward by Pirozzi (2009), this narrative is predicated on the standpoint that the institutional support and assistance to the AU through its various organs especially the components of the APSA, will have a far-reaching impact and implication in bolstering the operational, logistical, technical and financial capacity of the APSA in responding to the challenges associated with conflicts, violence, insecurity and other forms of transnational threats, that has negatively impacted on the continent concerning the various sectors and areas of security which include the political, military, economic, societal and environmental sectors.

Various studies indicate that the Lisbon Summit of December 2007 paved the avenue and the platform for a strategic roadmap for the relationship and synergy between Africa and Europe (Ramsbotham, Bah & Calder, 2005; Franke, 2009; Pirozzi, 2009; EU commission, 2018). A synergy that ensures the consolidation of over five decades of cooperation and assistance between these two multilateral institutions in the areas of trade and development. As an active and relevant player in international politics of integration, the EU is one of the major trading partners and largest donor to Africa, with issues around peace, security, conflict prevention, management and stability of Africa taking centre stage in these strategic relations (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004). This was further revealed by Sicurelli (2008) and Carbone (2013), who also maintained that one of the major factors and determinants of the strategic engagement between the AU and EU in conflict management and prevention was within the context and commitment of the EU which eventually saw the establishment of the African Peace Facility (APF) established in 2004. Upon the request from African leaders on the need for the EU through its development fund,

to support the AU and the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in enhancing its operational capacity to tackle the challenges associated with instability and conflicts in the continent. This support as shown by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), where it was seen to be within three fundamental priorities which include:

1. to ensure the effective operationalization of the APSA
2. to promote and enhance dialogue on the challenges to peace and security in Africa
3. to provide and create predictable funding for African- led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) (European Commission, 2018).

Between 2008 and 2020, financial support under the APF came under the following activities:



Allocation to Peace, Security and stability/good governance (Including Peace Support Operations)

Allocations to other Sectors

Figure 1. Amount Allocated to Peace and Security Under Indicative Programmes (RIPs) and the African Peace Facility (APF), 2008-2020* (million euros) – (APF figures for 2019-2020 are provisional).

(Source: European Court of Auditors, based on information provided by the European Commission. European Union Court of Auditors 2018 Special Report).




Figure 2: EU Funds Allocated to Implementing the APSA Under the APF and RIPs, 2008-2020 (million euros)¹

(Source: European Union Court of Auditors 2018 Special Report).

Since its establishment, the APF has assisted the continent to the tune of over €2,700,000,000 in making sure that peace, security, and conflicts ravaging the continent are managed and addressed.² The period between 2017 to 2018, revealed that the EU in its contribution to Early Response Mechanism (ERM), earmarked an action program to the tune of €20,000,000 which showed its continued support for

¹ For future periods currently allocated amounts are still subject to discussion and changes. For past periods, and as far as available, contracted amounts are used instead of allocated amounts. Source: European Court of Auditors, based on information provided by the European Commission.

² See European Union, “African Peace Facility. European Commission”, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en (accessed: 18 January 2019); European Union Commission, “The African Peace Facility A tangible commitment to peace and security in Africa”, (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/apf_brochure_final.pdf, (accessed 19 January 2019).

PSOs. It was also revealed that the EU directly contributed and assisted in 14 out of the 18 ongoing PSO missions in the continent to the tune of over €592,000,000 from the period 2017-2018. That commitment showed the resilience and willingness of the EU to engage and support Africa in managing these challenges associated with conflicts and insecurity in the continent (European Commission, 2018).

To further assist the continent deal with threats associated with the activities of terror and insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and its other rival group ISWAP in North-East Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, AQIM in the Maghreb, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Tuareg rebels in the Sahel region, and the Ansar al-Sunna extremist group in Cabo Delgado – Mozambique, saw the EU engage with the AU and the various RECs in the continent to forestall and manage the continued attacks by these groups (Griffin, 2016; Cross, 2017; European Union Commission, 2017a; 2017b). They see this commitment by the EU within the context of the provision of operational, logistical and financial assistance to this task force to address these security threats. In 2016, the EU assisted the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) with the sum of €50,000,000 to bolster its operational capacity in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency (United Nations, 2016). As indicated in studies by Osiewicz (2017), European Union (2018a; 2018b; 2018c) and the European Commission (2018), this stance and position was also reflected when the EU, forms part of the larger coalition of states and organizations in countering violent extremism, ‘the Financial Action Taskforce against Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering’ where it also partnered with AU and other RECs and states in the continent to adequately address and unanimously combat the threat posed by the continued presence and activities of these terror groups.

Therefore, the strategic engagement by the EU in Africa as it involves the promotion of peace, security, management, and prevention of conflicts cannot be overemphasized, where it was reflected and seen that the EU continued to assist the AU to tackle the challenges associated with conflicts and insecurities. Despite this support and help, certain challenges affect the effective attainment of sustainable peace, security, stability and its consolidation in Africa.

What are the Challenges of the AU-EU Security Strategy in Africa?

Over the past decade, the EU has engaged with the AU in various areas of strategic importance and development (Kereselidze, 2014; Carbone, 2016).

A narrative is believed by many that if the AU wants to take its place amongst the committee of nations, it should see the EU as a major strategic partner that can guarantee and ensure that its quest of not playing a 'second fiddle' role in global politics is realized. This was based on the firm commitment seen by the EU in assisting the AU to address some major challenges associated with the attainment of peace, security, development, managing and preventing the various cases and incidences of conflicts and violence that riddled the region (Adekeye, 2010; Makinda, Okumu & Mickler, 2015).

Consequently, as noted by Diez, Ian, and Richard (2011), and Anderson (2014), undoubtedly, the EU has assisted the AU in addressing complex security problems and challenges facing it. Despite this commitment by the EU, certain fundamental challenges affect the effective operationalization and smooth engagement of the EU-AU joint security strategy that will not only promote peace, and security, but will also ensure the sustainability of the peace process.

Within the framework and context of the EU peace and security strategy for the AU, studies by Wagnsson, Sperling & Hallenberg (2009), Olsen (2014), Van-Leangenhove (2016), and Tardy (2016) revealed that efforts and commitments towards a more coherent, virile, and less ambiguous security architecture, should be anchored on three interrelated pillars. It will reflect firstly, an EU/AU partnership that will help shape the peace, security, and stability related policies, actions and programs between the two institutions. Secondly, there should be an engagement that will replicate, and support the AU in building sustainable and effective institutions and mechanisms that will not only ensure, and guarantee peace and security for the regional actor, other RECs at the various sub-regional levels, governments, and citizens. Thirdly, there should be a form of contributory efforts geared towards building a strong and cohesive '*security community*' with the requisite capacity, and wherewithal to address the common and complex security challenges grappling the continent such as insurgency, militancy, piracy, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the use of child soldiers as weapon shields, trafficking in both human and organs, terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crimes. These discourse, narrative, and strategy should fall within the matrix and context of what has been defined as the EU's '*Triple F Strategy*' anchored on the notion, logic, and idea of incorporating a flexible, less

ambiguous and multi-sectoral approach in dealing with relevant partners to further enhance trust, confidence, and mutual benefits which will invariably maximize its strength, guarantee a swift and faster turnaround time in decision making to prevent stalemate and impasses (Tardy, 2016; AU, 2018).

Selective funding of the APSA is identified to be another challenge affecting the AU-EU strategic security partnership (Ambrosetti & Esmenjaud, 2014; Williams & Boutellis, 2014). This narrative is based on the fact that, rather than funding and emphasizing the other components of the APSA, the APF delve more efforts and commitment in funding activities around PSOs through the AU and the various RECs in the continent. With little attention in ensuring that the other components of the APSA such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWs), the Panel of the Wise (POWs) and the African Standby Force (ASF), remain institutionally and operationally moribund making it difficult for the APSA security framework to address the complex security challenges facing the continent effectively (Vines, 2010: 1092-1093; Dersso, 2013; Kim & Christian, 2018).

Accountability is a major challenge affecting AU-EU strategic security engagement given the fact despite the huge financial contribution and donation from the EU to the AU in addressing most of the PSOs engagements are misappropriated, diverted, and mismanaged by the top military high command involved in most of these missions. An example falls within the context of the current fight against insurgency in the North-eastern part of Nigeria extending to the Lake Chad region where it was reported that over USD 15,000,000,000 were illegally mismanaged by top officers of the Nigerian army and the MNJTF where it was seen that despite these resources allocated to counter the threats by this group, it seems to yield minimal impact as the group continue to carry out attacks with lethality and impunity (BBC News, 2016). This lack of proper accountability, and also the lack of an effective strategy that will ensure resources meant for peacekeeping engagements are not used judiciously, dampen the commitment of donor agencies in their support for peace and support operations in the continent (Pyman, 2013; Gidda, 2017; Ukpong, 2017; Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2020; Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020).

Furthermore, the conflicts in Burundi, the DRC, the Central African Republic and radical insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISWAP, the Tuareg rebels in Mali whose presence and continued attacks make up an

existential security threat to the peace and stability of the continent further created a complex security dilemma for both the AU and EU to manage (Olsen, 2014; Solomon, 2015). This is because these conflicts further lead to massive loss of lives, properties, investments, subsistence, and creating a massive humanitarian crisis in the continent. An example was seen that over 2,400,000 people are displaced because of the Boko Haram conflict. With investments and properties destroyed to the tune of over USD 9,000,000,000 (UNHCR, 2018). These continued attacks led to researchers questioning the operational capacity of the current conflict management strategies, multilateral actions and rules of engagement that will counter these threats. Because they consider the current strategy of countering the threats posed by these groups to be reductive, state-centric this makes it difficult for the current response anchored on troop deployment and the establishment of a task force to deal with these transnational threats. Because of this, the current counterterrorism strategy by these multilateral groups, may not address these challenges to peace and security in the continent (Onapajo, 2017; Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020).

Studies by Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele (2012), European Union (2013) and Ansorg (2017) revealed that operationalizing the EU strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR) that will further consolidate its security relations with the AU is considered ambiguous and shrouded with certain complexities and lack of clarity. This form of ambiguity further complicates its effective engagement with the AU in dealing with threats to peace as security in the continent. Consequently, some studies also discovered that the AU recognizes the ignoble role of the security sector in the perpetration of violence. That narrative makes it more proactive in designing policy on SSR in the continent. This was reflected in the important role of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and ensuring the democratization of the security sector. This policy operates within the standpoint that PMSCs should not take part in the conflict management process in the continent given that, their objectivity and neutrality is questioned. Furthermore, the SSR policy believes strongly in the mainstreaming of the sector in response to the involvement of the military in African politics (Gbla, 2006; Detzner, 2017). Therefore, the outsourcing of security functions by the state represents an era where the private sector is playing a leading role in security provisioning. There is a sense in which the success of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone was attributed to the involvement of Executive Outcomes (EO). There have been calls for Africa to accept the reality of private sector involvement in

peacekeeping as evidence suggests the increased reluctance of the western nations to contribute their personnel in peacekeeping related activities especially the lack of clarity of the SSR framework of the EU (Ehrhart, 2006; Berg & Howell, 2017; Varin, 2018).

As observed by Muthien & Taylor (2002), Foaleng (2007), and Meunier (2014), that while there are concerns about the outsourcing of peace and security-related responsibilities to the private sector, there is a limit to what the AU can do in this light because its involvement in peacekeeping and peace-building related functions across the continent is done using the purse of the EU and other donor agencies. This narrative tends to be predicated in line with Volker (2008), sentiments that “nobody has ever gone to war using another person’s purse”. Thus, with this position and perspective, the AU needs to understand that its overreliance and dependence on the EU and other donor agencies is of great disservice to it given that the EU also has its share of security challenges and other contending problems. As noted by Rieker & Blockmans (2019), the EU since 2011 is said to be confronted with a series of challenges that are considered to be internal and external. These challenges ranged from the lack of effective security cooperation between the EU and other multilateral institutions such as the UN and NATO, issues around illegal migration to Europe, to the Euro-zone crises, the rise of populism and neo-fascist ideologies in Europe, challenges associated with BREXIT, the existential reality of the increase in terror-related attacks and incidences, and other complex and contending problems threatening the Union (Koops, 2011; 2012; Wodak, Khosravini & Mral, 2013; Statham & Trez, 2015; Heisbourg, 2016; Rosamond, 2016; Chtouris & Miller, 2017; Nugent, 2017; ICG, 2017; Fragapane & Giancarlo, 2018; Kim & Christian, 2018). These challenges threatening the stability of this regional actor is a pointer to the AU on the need to not only show a level of seriousness that its future and quest to proffering solutions to African problems should not be hinged on depending on aid from other international institutions and governments. In other words, the need for the AU and African leaders to ‘think outside the box’, by taking ownership and driving the process to adequately address the challenges grappling the continent thereby, affecting its stability, security, peace, and development (Ejdus, 2017).

Given that the situation on the ground so far revealed that regarding the responsibilities of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) has shown non-significant improvement in terms of the transformation from the OAU to the AU. This is because, the setting up of the PSC has not been sufficiently matched with increased resources and funding, which reinforces the reliance on foreign donors such as the EU. Also, other components of the APSA like the ASF for example were supposed to have been operational since 2010. So far, for challenges associated with inadequate funding, other forms of institutional and structural challenge, such commitment from the AU has not been realized concerning having a dedicated standby force for rapid deployment in response to a complex emergency in the face of reluctance by the superpowers to provide their human resource for such exercise (Williams, 2008; Nathan, 2009; Onditi & Okoth, 2017). Therefore, the AU needs to rise above press statements and rhetoric but be seen to take charge of leading the path to the guarantee, and sustainability of peace, security, and stability of the continent and also, ensure that its relationship with other multilateral institutions like the EU should not be anchored on subservience and dependency but for equal and favourable exchange.

Conclusion and Policy Implication

The AU-EU strategic security partnership opens a significant opportunity and vistas for the two multilateral players to build upon comparative advantages where they exist. The EU framework for relations with the AU should be [one that is] premised on the notion of cooperation for the promotion of peace and security in a way that benefits both sides. While the AU may claim ownership and seek to relate with the EU to benefit from it, its collaboration will to a large extent depend on the willingness of the EU to commit its logistics and resources to effectively ensure peace and security through the effective operationalization, effectiveness and capacity of the AU-APSA security mechanism of the AU to proffer solutions to the much-needed security challenges facing the continent.

However, the AU should also realize that the era of depending on aid and assistance from the EU and other multilateral agencies is over. For it to actualize its goal of addressing the continent's security challenges, the AU needs to take ownership and drive the process and not depend on aid from other agencies as these

will plunge it further into the position of subservience and affect it's in dealing with African problems head-on.

Findings of the article further suggest that although the European Union's strategic security engagement in the continent supports the broader security framework of the African Union, challenges such as selective funding, lack of accountability, the ambiguities surrounding the role of private security companies in Africa, the overdependence on the part of the African Union on external donors to drive the security process in the continent, and the existential reality of the ever-increasing multidimensionality of threats and threats perceptions in the international system tend to affect the effective operationalization of this joint-security partnership between the European Union and the African Union.

Genişletilmiş Özet

Birçok Afrika ülkesi bağımsızlıklarından sonra iç savaşları ve toplu katliamları içeren şiddetli dönüşümler yaşamış ve devlet içiyle devletlerarası çatışmaların sahnesi olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bunun nedeni olarak, bağımsızlıktan sonra bölgedeki çoğu devletin, uzun vadede sadece kıtanın istikrarı üzerinde değil, Asya ve Latin Amerika'daki benzerlerine kıyasla aynı zamanda kıtanın az gelişmişliğine de katkıda bulunan çeşitli şiddet ve çatışmalara tanık olması gösterilebilir. Silahlı Çatışma Yeri ve Olay Verileri Projesi (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) (2017) tarafınca belirtildiği üzere, Afrika'daki çatışmaların ve güvensizliğin doğası, bir milyondan fazla kayıtlı ölüme ve kıtadaki çeşitli mülteci kamplarına dağılmış milyonlarca insanın yerinden edilmesine yol açmıştır. Bu güvenlik sorunları, kıtadaki çeşitli bölgesel, alt-bölgesel ve devlet oyuncularından yine bölgesel, alt-bölgesel ve devlet seviyesinde müdahalelerini gerektirmektedir. Sonrasında ise Afrika Birliği'ne (AfB) dönüşen feshedilmiş Afrika Birliği Örgütü (ABÖ), kıtadaki sorunlara gerekli çözümleri sunarak bu zorlukların üstesinden gelmeyi başaramamıştır.

Bu minvalde makale, AfB ile AB arasındaki çatışma yönetimindeki stratejik güvenlik rolünü ve katılımını, barışı, güvenliği, yönetimi ve çözümünü teşvik etmeyi amaçlayan etkili bir güvenlik topluluğunu güçlendirmenin daha geniş resmini ve bağlamını içerecektir. Bunu yaparken, AfB ile AB arasındaki çatışma yönetimindeki stratejik ilişkiyi, ortak güvenlik iş birliğinin niteliği hakkında önemli araştırma sorularıyla değerlendirecektir. Afrika'da çatışma yönetimi için etkili bir AfB-AB

ortak güvenlik topluluğu stratejisini engelleyen zorluklar nelerdir? Makale, vaka çalışmalarının stratejik güvenlik katılımına odaklanan mevcut literatürün kapsamlı bir incelemesini içeren nitel bir araştırma yaklaşımı benimseyecektir. Makale, “güvenlik topluluğu”nun (*security community*) kuramsal bağlamı ve çerçevesi içinde güvenlik iş birliğine ilişkin mevcut tartışmaya ve anlatıya katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Güvenlik topluluğu, barış ve istikrarın sağlanmasında ve çeşitli yerel ve ulusötesi tehditlerin kontrol altına alınmasında bu tür bir iş birliğini önemli görmektedir.

AfB sahiplik iddiasında bulunup AB’den faydalanmak için ilişki kurmaya çalışsa da iş birliği büyük ölçüde AB’nin istekliliğine bağlı olacaktır. Kıtanın karşı karşıya olduğu acil ihtiyaç duyulan güvenlik sorunlarına çözümler sunmak için AfB’nin, AfB-APSA güvenlik mekanizmasının etkinliği ve kapasitesi aracılığıyla lojistiğini ve kaynaklarını etkin bir şekilde barış ve güvenliği sağlamaya adanması gerekmektedir.

Bununla birlikte AfB, AB ve diğer çok taraflı kurumların yardım ve desteklerine bağlı kalma döneminin sona erdiğini de anlamalıdır. Kıtanın karşı karşıya olduğu güvenlik sorunlarını çözme hedefini gerçekleştirmesi için, AfB’nin süreci sahiplenmesi ve yönlendirmesiyle diğer kurumların yardımına bağlı olmaması gerekmektedir. Netice itibarıyla AfB’nin daha fazla boyun eğmesine sebebiyet vermekte ve Afrika sorunlarıyla doğrudan başa çıkmada yetisini etkilemektedir.

Makalenin bulguları, Avrupa Birliği’nin kıtadaki stratejik güvenlik katılımının Afrika Birliği’nin daha geniş güvenlik çerçevesini desteklemesine rağmen, seçici finansman, hesap verebilirlik eksikliği, Afrika’daki özel güvenlik şirketlerinin rolünü çevreleyen belirsizlikler, Afrika Birliği’nin kıtadaki güvenlik sürecini yönlendirmek için dış bağışçılara aşırı bağımlılığı gibi zorlukları desteklediğini göstermektedir. Uluslararası sistemdeki tehditlerin ve tehdit algılarının giderek artan çok boyutluluğunun varoluşsal gerçekliği, Avrupa Birliği ve Afrika Birliği arasındaki bu ortak güvenlik ortaklığının etkin operasyonelleşmesini etkileme eğilimindedir.

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